For to people of that sort, just as to those lacking self-restraint, knowledge is without benefit. But to those who fashion their longings in accord with reason and act accordingly, knowing about these things would be of great profit.
aristotle's Nicomachean Ethicsby aristotle
The case is similar with the idea as well: even if there is some one good thing that is predicated [of things] in common, or there is some separate thing, itself by itself, it is clear that it would not be subject to action or capable of being possessed by a human being.
Among people lacking self-restraint, those apt to be impulsive are better than those who are in possession of an argument [logos] but do not abide by it.
Baseness that does not possess its own starting point [or principle] is always less harmful than that which does possess it, and intellect is such a starting point.
In general, then, pleasure is not good, because every pleasure is a perceptible process of coming into its nature; but no coming-into-being belongs to the same class as the ends we pursue.
For [people] are good in one way, but in all kinds of ways bad.